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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to determine if the Pacific Fleet private shipyard 
depot-level maintenance pilot program created financial flexibility by using Other 
Procurement Navy funds instead of Operation and Maintenance Navy funds. A 
questionnaire was sent to the Navy’s Office of Budget and Pacific Fleet’s comptroller 
and maintenance teams to understand what changes occurred and how they adapted to the 
changes. This thesis identified the positive and negative effects of the pilot and concludes 
that the Navy did benefit from the change in funding appropriations because it allowed 
for better contracting strategies by alleviating the time pressure of use or lose funds, 
which allowed for stable funding and competitive bids from contractors, reducing the 
amount of most contracts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is a case study of the private shipyard maintenance pilot program 
Congress authorized in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020. This research will 
compare the one-year Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN) against the three-year 
Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) funds to determine whether the change resolved the 
funding and flexibility problems previously experienced, created new problems, or created 
neutral changes. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Navy operates four public shipyards in the United States: Norfolk Naval 
Shipyard and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, servicing the East Coast and Puget Sound Naval 
Shipyard and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, servicing the West Coast. Additionally, the 
Navy utilizes 26 private shipyards, 17 on the East or Gulf Coasts and nine on the West 
Coast or Hawaii, for up to half its depot-level maintenance requirements. 
Due to Base Realignment and Closure decisions in the 1990s, the Navy closed four 
public shipyards. The remaining four public shipyards had enough capacity at the time to 
manage the workload, but today there is a lack of capacity (Clark, 2020). To better manage 
ship maintenance, the Navy began consolidating its intermediate maintenance activities 
(IMAs) with their public shipyards (Cain, 2006). Pearl Harbor began this pilot program in 
1996, followed by Puget Sound in 2003 and concluding with Norfolk and Portsmouth in 
2006. As a result, the Navy relies heavily on private shipyards to supplement the 
overburdened public shipyards. Martin et al. note that the public-private split of workload 
is approaching the legal limit of 50 percent of work done at each type of shipyard (2017). 
With the Navy’s recently increased focus on ship maintenance, former Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisitions (ASN (RDA)), James 
Guerts, noted the Navy’s shipbuilding plan is “only as good as our ability to continue to 
repair and modernize those ships once we build them” (Eckstein, 2019, para. 5). Guerts 
also spoke of his desire to include a long-range forecast for maintenance and modernization 
to accompany the 30-year shipbuilding plan. Additionally, Guerts is producing a Private 
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Sector Improvement program to address issues and barriers to realize on-time delivery of 
ships out of maintenance availabilities. To more effectively use private shipyards, Martin 
et al. suggest a change in funding strategies may be needed to achieve maximum results 
(2017). 
Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) added language to the fiscal year (FY) 2020 President’s 
Budget (PB), asking to keep available $3.3B OMN funding available until September 30, 
2021. In short, PACFLT was asking Congress for two-year OMN money, whereas OMN 
money is normally one-year funding. Congress disagreed with the two-year OMN 
authorization, acknowledged the need for multi-fiscal year funding, and appropriated three-
year OPN funding for a pilot program (U.S. Senate, 2020).  
B. PURPOSE 
This research aims to compare the results of the maintenance pilot program to the 
expectations from two different echelons of the Navy, the Secretariat and the fleet 
commander. The research draws conclusions about the ability to use OPN funds across 
multiple fiscal years, looking at the Navy Secretariat, Fleet comptroller, and Fleet 
maintenance planner perspectives. The Secretariat and fleet commander levels were chosen 
because they are the most heavily impacted by the change of funding sources. The fleet 
comptroller and fleet maintenance planners’ perspectives were used to determine the 
impacts on the fleet commander because these offices will be required to change their 
policies and procedures to comply with the pilot program. The Navy’s Office of Budget 
(FMB) perspective was used to determine the perspective of the Navy Secretariat because 
FMB is the office responsible for the budget formulation, justification, and execution. The 
Navy Secretariat is politically appointed and represents the civilian side of the Navy 
leadership. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following is the primary research question: 
1. Did changing funding sources from OMN to OPN achieve more financial 
flexibility for ship depot maintenance? 
3 
To answer the primary question, there are three secondary questions: 
2. What was the reason to ask Congress to change the funding structure of 
ship depot maintenance? 
3. What positive outcomes did the change to OPN create?  
4. What adverse outcomes did the change to OPN create? 
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis covers the PACFLT pilot program that started in FY20 and continues 
through FY22. The PACFLT pilot program is limited to contracted CNO maintenance 
availabilities in private shipyards. Data sources include answers to a Naval Postgraduate 
School Institutional Review Board-approved questionnaire (the Appendix) from FMB, 
PACFLT comptroller office (budget execution and budget formulation branches), and 
PACFLT maintenance planners (N43). Additional data sources include FMB quarterly and 
annual reports to Congress, Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports, Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) budget 
justifications, public law and Congressional Joint Explanatory Statements. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II presents a detailed overview of the levels of maintenance and issues the 
maintenance organization faces. Chapter III provides an overview of the government 
funding process and the historical funding mechanisms used by public and private 
shipyards since the 1950s. Chapter IV analyzes the questionnaire data from the 
perspectives of FMB, PACFLT comptroller office, and PACFLT maintenance planners. 
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II. NAVY MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION 
This chapter discusses the types of work done at each level of maintenance and the 
issues facing the maintenance organization. While this thesis is limited to one particular 
type of maintenance under contract at private shipyards, it is imperative to understand the 
maintenance levels to fully understand how a change in the funding process reverberates 
throughout the maintenance complex. A brief description of organizational and 
intermediate-level maintenance is included because uncompleted and deferred 
maintenance actions at these levels can be included in depot-level maintenance. 
A. LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE 
This thesis is focused solely on depot-level maintenance. Since depot-level 
maintenance can include organizational and intermediate-level maintenance, it will be 
helpful to understand the continuum of maintenance. Ship maintenance occurs at three 
different levels performed at various locations. Maintenance tasks are allocated to one level 
of maintenance based on capability, scope, and capacity to ensure proper accomplishment. 
Organizational maintenance is the lowest level of maintenance, typically performed 
onboard ships. The next higher level of maintenance is intermediate, performed at 
intermediate/regional maintenance facilities. Finally, the highest level of maintenance is 
depot-level, typically conducted at public or private shipyards. 
1. Organizational Maintenance 
Organizational maintenance is the lowest level of maintenance and is performed 
onboard the ship by Navy personnel. Tasks performed are either preventative or corrective. 
Ships are required to be as self-sufficient as possible. Still, due to the limited space and 
availability onboard, ships cannot perform certain types of maintenance they otherwise 
might be capable of completing. According to OPNAV Instruction 4700.7M (2019), 
typical organizational level tasks include: 
• Facilities maintenance, such as cleaning and proper preservation  
6 
• Routine systems and component planned maintenance, such as 
inspections, systems operability tests and diagnostics, lubrication, 
calibration, and cleaning  
• Corrective maintenance, such as hull, mechanical and electrical 
troubleshooting down to the lowest replaceable unit level, miniature and 
micro-miniature electronic repair, component change-out, and in some 
cases, complete disassembly and repair in place, and to restore 
components to operation  
• Assistance to higher (intermediate or depot) level maintenance activities 
• Verification and quality assurance of maintenance accomplished by other 
activities 
• Ensuring documentation of all deferred and completed maintenance 
actions, whether performed by ship’s force or by other activities (OPNAV, 
2019). 
Organizational maintenance can be assigned to a higher-level facility due to 
operational backlog, lack of equipment, lack of capacity, or to be included in a continuous 
maintenance availability (CMAV), a window of opportunity (WOO) or CNO availability. 
CMAVs and WOOs are intermediate-level maintenance performed at a ship’s homeport. 
The only difference between a CMAV and a WOO is the length of the project. CMAVs 
must be at least 21 days, whereas WOOs take advantage of any maintenance period 
between 14 to 21 days. A CNO availability is depot-level work that can be accomplished 
either at the ship’s homeport or a public or private shipyard. These availabilities last more 
than six months and can last for multiple years. 
2. Intermediate Maintenance 
Intermediate maintenance requires skills, equipment, or capacity not found onboard 
a ship. Navy and civilian personnel perform this level of maintenance at fleet maintenance 
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activities (FMAs). OPNAV’s Maintenance Policy for Navy Ships (2019) state FMAs 
include: 
• Intermediate Maintenance Activities 
• Battle Group Maintenance Activities, usually located on a carrier 
• Regional Maintenance Centers (RMCs) 
• Submarine Refit and Support Facilities (OPNAV, 2019). 
Additionally, intermediate tasks can include, but not limited to: 
• Preventive maintenance 
• Corrective maintenance 
• Tests and inspections 
• Provision of services such as electrical power, water, gas, and air 
replenishment and tool issues  
• Installation of alterations  
• Work on electronic circuit boards, components, modules, subassemblies, 
and other equipment coded for intermediate-level repair 
• Calibration and repair services for electrical and electronic test and 
monitoring equipment, measuring pressure, vacuum, temperature and 
mechanical devices 
• Technical assistance to ship’s force in diagnosing system or equipment 
problems and assistance in repairs 
• Assistance in the emergency repair and manufacture of unavailable 
replacement parts or assemblies (OPNAV, 2019). 
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Intermediate maintenance can happen anytime when a ship is not on a mission. A 
CMAV is TYCOM scheduled availability, typically between 30 to 90 days. Intermediate 
maintenance is supported in shorter timeframes, called a WOO, which generally lasts 2–4 
weeks. Tasks that the intermediate activity cannot perform can be assigned to a depot-level 
activity if the work exceeds the intermediate maintenance facility capacity.  
3. Depot Maintenance 
Depot-level maintenance is the highest and most intensive of all the levels of 
maintenance. This thesis is focused solely on depot-level maintenance of contracted ship 
maintenance in private shipyards. Depot maintenance can be done in three locations: 
pierside, a public shipyard, or a private shipyard. Depot-level work done pierside will be 
limited in its scope. Maintenance done in shipyards tends to be intensive and typically lasts 
between 9–15 months—but can sometimes last for years.  








• refurbishment and rebuilding 




• assemblies and subassemblies  
• software, components, or end items that require specialized facilities, 
tooling, support equipment, personnel with higher technical skill, or 
processes beyond the scope or capacity of the intermediate maintenance 
actions (OPNAV, 2019, p. 6-1). 
Depot-level maintenance is strategically planned years in advance of the 
availability. Multiple commands coordinate to get ships into and out of availabilities on 
time. The performance-to-plan (P2P) process has identified performance gaps. It has 
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removed barriers to execution in progress towards the CNO’s goal of zero lost days of 
shipyard maintenance. Increased focus on on-time deliveries has reduced its average delay 
from 143 days in FY18 to completion three days ahead of schedule in FY20 (Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management & Comptroller, 2021). 
Additionally, the shipyards increased their on-time rate from 24 percent in FY18 to 72 
percent in FY20.  
Figure 1 shows the public and private shipyards in use by the Navy. 
10 
 
Figure 1. U.S. Public and Private Shipyard Locations. Source: GAO (2020). 
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B. MAINTENANCE ISSUES 
According to Button et al. (2015), fleet commanders are responsible for scheduling 
the availability and repair actions. Many factors affect the Navy’s ability to accomplish all 
required maintenance on time and within budget. The Navy’s previous decision to reduce 
the crew size to save personnel costs has resulted in less organizational maintenance 
completed onboard (Maurer, 2019). Because less maintenance is being done on board, the 
minor problems that the ship’s force could fix get worse. The worsening of the problems, 
the more maintenance is required. The more maintenance required, the longer and more 
expensive the availability is. The delayed shipyard delivery has a negative feedback loop 
on the remainder of the fleet. Other ships must delay their maintenance and extend their 
deployment, increasing the number of repairs needed once in maintenance. This negative 
cycle continues to repeat itself, ship after ship. Thus, a downward spiral of readiness issues 
began to impact the fleet. Button et al. (2015) also noted that deployment schedules, 
emergent repairs, unexpected availability growth would factor into the scheduling 
determination. Also, having a shipyard available to conduct the work will play a critical 
factor in determining the schedules. As mentioned in Chapter I, there is a finite number of 
shipyards available to conduct depot-level maintenance. The Navy also competes with the 
commercial shipping industry for availability in private shipyards. 
Between 2003 through 2012, the Navy reduced personnel costs by reducing the 
crew size on its ships. This reduction in crew size resulted in an increased workload on the 
crew, which reduced or deferred the organizational maintenance performed on the ship 
(Maurer, 2019). Additionally, the deferred maintenance cost more in the long run because 
the problems worsened. Many of these repairs had to be fixed during depot-level 
maintenance because they were outside of organizational or intermediate-level capabilities, 
leading to longer and more expensive availabilities.  
To ensure mission readiness during periods of high operational tempo, the Navy 
extended deployments, causing more wear and tear and resulting in more maintenance 
issues for the fleet. The high operational tempo places a higher priority on combat systems-
related maintenance at a cost to systems that can reduce the ship’s service life, for example, 
fuel and ballast tanks (Maurer, 2019).  
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Once in an availability, the maintenance team identifies and corrects a majority of 
the issues found. Depending on when the problem is identified and the steps to fix the 
problem, the availability may have to be extended. For example, suppose the fuel tank is 
one of the last items to be corrected, and the maintenance team finds a crack. In that case, 
the availability could be extended to fix the problem before it is safe for the ship to return 
to the fleet. If the crack is more prominent than anticipated or multiple cracks are found, it 
is considered growth work. If the crack is discovered that was not anticipated or contracted 
to be repaired, it is considered new work. This extension creates other issues for the fleet. 
First, the extended availability means another ship cannot start its availability on time due 
to capacity constraints. Second, the new work is not funded but is required. Third, the delay 
reduces the time available for operational training resulting in more underway days and 
less time for emergent repairs or other scheduled maintenance. Fourth, depending on the 
length of the extension, another ship may have to assume the scheduled deployment.  
Suppose this new or growth work is found toward the end of the FY, contracting 
and funding deadlines inhibit effective resource management. New or growth work cost 
the Navy $332 million in FY18, $126 million in FY19 and $152 million in FY20 (Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management & Comptroller), 2021). In 
addition, the same report notes, in FY18, there were 13 upward obligation packages for 
seven ships totaling $108 million. In FY19, there were seven upward obligation packages 
for four ships totaling $66 million. Furthermore, in FY20, there were three upward 
obligation packages for three ships totaling $30 million. It should be noted that the 
downward trend may be from the shorter time between the end of the FY and the date the 
data was derived. The number of upward obligations increases as time passes. As discussed 
in Chapter III, the funds in all three FYs are still available to liquidate in-scope adjustments. 
Additionally, the Navy previously lost some of its buying power because not all OMN 
funds are expended every year. The Navy identified that ship maintenance accounts for 20 
percent of all unobligated OMN funds (U.S. Senate, 2019).  
The Chief of Naval Operations’ renewed focus on on-time delivery meets the 
Navy’s deployment needs. To address the decline in ship readiness and increase on-time 
completion rates, CNO Gilday established a goal to “predictably and effectively maintain 
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the fleet” in his Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority (2019, p. 2). Gilday’s goal is 
to increase the on-time delivery of ships from maintenance from 40% to 80%. Likewise, 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Commander, VADM Bill Galinis, stated in an 
interview with USNI News, his three main focuses are “on-time delivery of ships in 
construction and maintenance, improving material availability to support maintenance 
activities and increasing capacity to do work by creating more efficiency and better flow 
within public and private repair yards” (Eckstein, 2020, para. 4). The comments by the 
CNO and NAVSEA show their priorities in dealing with ship maintenance. The Navy has 
reduced its average delay from 143 days in FY18 to three days ahead of schedule in FY20, 
increasing its on-time rate from 24 percent in FY18 to 72 percent in FY20 (Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management & Comptroller), 2021).  
C. FUNDING ISSUES 
Former ASN (RDA), James Guerts, testified to Congress that a lack of stable and 
consistent funding has adversely affected ship maintenance.  
[A] stable and predictable budget is crucial to the Navy’s ability to execute 
contracts and maintenance actions required to keep our Navy in the fight … 
delaying these planned activities has drastic downstream impacts – injecting 
instability in the industrial base and creating large cost impacts and 
inefficiencies that can extend beyond the duration of the uncertainty” (Ship 
and submarine maintenance, 2019). 
The Navy has identified, and Congress has acknowledged (U.S. Senate, 2020) that 
20 percent of OMN funds that are unobligated come from the 1B4B ship maintenance 
account. The loss of this funding creates further readiness gaps for the fleet. The loss of 
funds has a two-fold effect. First, the Navy is unable to utilize the funds that were 
authorized and appropriated. Second, current year funds that were not programmed or 
budgeted could have to be used for any new or growth work that arises.  
Stable funding means the contractors are assured of future work and can more 
accurately plan their projects and workforce. This stability has resulted in less business risk 
for the contractors, which results in more favorable contracts for the Navy.  
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The end of the fiscal year creates legally imposed timelines and barriers not seen 
outside the government. These barriers and timelines create a pressurized atmosphere 
within the government to use the available funds or are lost forever. The pressure to use 
the funds has resulted in business risk for the Navy. The Navy is rushed into shortened 
planning and scoping of work and has, historically, inadequately understood the material 
condition of the ships and undervalued the work needed to be performed to maintain the 
ships. This time constraint has led to rushed contracts that necessitate growth work and 
new work, which has led to upward obligations to pay for the work without using current 
year funds. Chapter III discusses the timeline restrictions in more detail.  
Continuing resolutions (CR) have been a budgetary norm for the past 50 years. 
Since 1971, only ten times has the defense appropriations passed and signed into law on 
time (DeBruyne & Torreon, 2020). Debruyne & Torreon also noted that the average CR 
lasted 72 days when late. Having a CR last for over two months each year has a dramatic 
effect on the buying power of the Navy. The CR period is a business risk to the shipyards 
because of the uncertainty of future funding. Combining the reduced buying power and 
business risk for the contractors, the Navy has been negotiating from an inferior position.  
A case study done by the GAO (Oakley, 2019) showcases the interconnectivity of 
maintenance and funding issues using a case study of the USS Chosin. In the case study, 
the ship had just completed a maintenance availability and was in a modernization 
availability. Additional maintenance work was added when the contractor was able to 
thoroughly inspect all of the areas within the work package, increasing the availability cost. 
In addition, long lead-time materials (LLTM) had to be ordered but were delayed “because 
the Navy was unsure of its process for funding this request” (Oakley, 2019, p. 33). The FY 
had elapsed, and OMN funds were now in an “expired” status while waiting on a funding 
determination. The Navy sent an upward obligation request for approval, delaying the 
availability for another five months. 
The GAO noted that the Navy recognized that upward obligations approval 
timelines contribute to schedule delays because work cannot be completed without 
funding. However, the Navy did not explore any alternate solutions (Oakley, 2019). The 
GAO identified best practices for a successful pilot program to 
15 
• Establish well-defined, appropriate, clear and measurable objectives 
• Clearly articulate assessment methodology and data gathering strategy 
that addresses all components of the pilot program and includes key 
features of a sound plan 
• Identify criteria or standards for identifying lessons about the pilot to 
inform decisions about scalability and whether, how and when to 
integrate pilot activities into overall efforts 
• Develop a detailed data-analysis plan to track the pilot program’s 
implementation and performance and evaluate the final results of the 
project and draw conclusions on whether, how and when to integrate 
pilot activities into overall efforts 
• Ensure appropriate two-way stakeholder communication and input at all 
stages of the pilot project, including design, implementation, data 
gathering and assessment (Oakley, 2019, pp. 35–36). 
GAO notes that these best practices will allow for proper analysis of the PACFLT 
OPN pilot program and identify any hidden maintenance factors that would be obvious 
without delays caused by the upward obligations process (Oakley, 2019). In addition, the 
best practices will allow for a comparative analysis between the pilot program and the non-
pilot availabilities. The goal of the analysis would be to advise Congress and Navy 
leadership if this pilot program should be expanded.  
16 
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III. FUNDING PROCESS 
This chapter will discuss the foundations of government funding with an overview 
of the three types of funding the Navy has historically used for ship depot maintenance: 
working capital fund (WCF), OMN, and now, OPN. The budget process starts years before 
the budget will come into effect. There are many different organizations and many different 
levels within those organizations that bear the final outcome in the process. It is essential 
to know the key players and functions to understand the impacts of changing funding 
sources on organizations presently and in the future. 
A. FOUNDATIONS OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING 
All funding is a product of Congressional action. Article I, Section 9 of the 
Constitutions states, “[n]o money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence 
of Appropriations made by Law” (U.S. Const. art I, § 9). Furthermore, the Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974 requires the House of Representatives and Senate committees to 
provide budgets for which they have jurisdiction (31 U.S.C. § 302, 1974). For defense 
matters, the committees involved are the Budget, Armed Services, and Appropriations 
committees of the House and Senate. Congressional consideration about ship depot 
maintenance is not solely focused on the national security and national budget implications 
but on the effect the maintenance facilities have on local jobs and the industrial base.  
Through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the President consolidates 
the Executive Departments’ budget requests into the Presidential Budget (PB) and presents 
it to Congress by the first Monday in February.  
Once the PB is presented to Congress, the Budget Committees are responsible for 
developing the annual budget resolution. The annual budget resolution sets the spending 
level or targets and spending limits. The budget resolution is a planning document for the 
authorizers and appropriators. As the budget resolution is not a law, it does not have to be 
sent to or signed by the President.  
Once the budget resolution has been approved, the other committees of Congress 
begin their process. First, The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and Senate 
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Armed Services Committee (SASC) are the authorizing committees for all bills relating to 
defense. The HASC and SASC are responsible for producing the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA), which authorizes appropriations and individual programs. 
Each chamber’s committee begins working on the NDAA separately but nearly 
simultaneously. Both committees hold hearings and markups before a committee vote and 
finally a House and Senate vote. Once passed, the House bill and the Senate bill are 
compared. If the two versions are not identical, a conference committee consisting of both 
the HASC and SASC is called to resolve the differences. Once the differences are 
reconciled, the committee presents their new bill to the full House and Senate for another 
vote. If approved, the NDAA goes to the President for signature into law. 
The House Appropriations Committee (HAC) and Senate Appropriations 
Committee (SAC) produce 12 budget appropriations. Of concern to this thesis is the 
Department of Defense Appropriations Act. The Department of Defense Appropriations 
Act provides the budget authority to DOD to obligate funds for defense programs. The 
committee process is similar to the work of the HASC and SASC, except the Budget 
Appropriations Act must be originated by the HAC to comply with the Constitution. There 
is no requirement that the Appropriations Act must agree with the NDAA. Additionally, 
suppose the budget does not get signed into law by the start of the fiscal year. In that case, 
the Appropriations Committees can pass a CR to be signed by the President for short-term 
bridge funding until the full fiscal year’s appropriation is signed into law. The 
appropriation authority for a CR is usually set at the previous year’s level and typically 
does not authorize any new programs to be funded.  
In summary, Congress passes the budget using three committees, the Budget, 
Armed Services, and Appropriations Committees. The Budget Committee sets the 
spending target for the next fiscal year. The Armed Services Committees authorize the 
programs and spending. Finally, the Appropriations Committee grants the funding to be 
spent. If a budget is not passed by the beginning of the fiscal year, a CR can be passed to 
keep the government funded at the prior year’s authority. 
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B. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, EXECUTION 
The Navy is working on three different budgets simultaneously, all in a different 
phase of the planning, programming, budgeting, execution (PPBE) process. Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU) (2021) defines the PPBE process as:  
PPBE is the primary Resource Allocation Process of DOD. It is one of three 
major decision support systems for defense acquisition, along with the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and the Defense 
Acquisition System. It is a formal, systematic structure for making decisions 
on policy, strategy, and the development of forces and capabilities to 
accomplish anticipated missions. PPBE is an annual process which 
produces the Secretary’s Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), five year 
approved Program Objectives Memoranda (POMs), and one-year Budget 
Estimate Submissions (BES) for the military departments and defense 
agencies, and the DOD portion of the President’s Budget (PB).  
The current PPBE process has evolved from the Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System, introduced to the DOD in the 1960s by Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara (DAU, 2021). PPBE is designed to identify and fill requirements to accomplish 
the mission of the National Security Strategy (NSS). The PPBE process is designed to 
manage the resources available and anticipate future requirements and determine budget 
estimates across the five-year, future-year defense programs (FYDP). The PPBE process 
works in conjunction with the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS), which determines the requirements, and the defense acquisition system, which 
obtains the items that meet those requirements. However, the timing of the three 
components is not in line with each other. JCIDS and the defense acquisition system are 
event-driven, while the PPBE process is calendar-driven. 
The Navy’s maintenance planners begin the planning phase with an annual report 
to Congress, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan of Construction of Naval 
Vessels. The Navy provides a 30-year shipbuilding plan that shows the proposed new ships 
with the anticipated decommissioned ships along with the annual report. NAVSEA creates 
a life-cycle maintenance plan from these planning documents to identify the maintenance 
intervals required to ensure the ship reaches its stated end of service life. While depot 
maintenance is not an initial factor of shipbuilding in the planning phase, planners must 
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understand the life-cycle maintenance for future budgets. Also, planners must contend with 
ships requiring maintenance already within the budget years of the Program Objectives 
Memorandum (POM). The POM is a five-year proposal from each service that anticipates 
how the service will use its future resources to meet strategic guidance. Items required in 
the POM are force structure, major acquisition program starts, any program shortfalls and 
the risks associated with the shortfalls. 
Former Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, made readiness his top priority after 
coming into the office (Mattis, 2017). In testimony to the SASC, former Vice Chief of 
Naval Operations (VCNO), ADM Bill Moran, reiterated Secretary Mattis’ priority of 
readiness in a hearing on the Navy’s state of readiness (Current Readiness of U.S. Armed 
Forces, 2017). Having the budgetary guidance from the SECDEF and VCNO, the 
programmers could prioritize shipyard maintenance over other projects now deemed 
“lower priority.” 
In the President’s FY20 Budget proposal to Congress, a request was made to keep 
$3.3 billion OMN funds available for a two-year period for private contracted ship 
maintenance (White House, 2019). Knowing the need for greater flexibility and 20 percent 
of all unobligated OMN funds are from ship maintenance, the Senate transferred $1 billion 
from OMN 1B4B, ship maintenance and modernization account, to OPN (U.S. Senate, 
2020). PACFLT, now, must budget OMN in addition to the new OPN appropriation.  
The PACFLT Comptroller is responsible for the execution of the shipyard 
maintenance budget. The pilot program did not change this responsibility. This research 
focuses on determining the advantages and disadvantages the change in funding 
mechanisms had on the execution process. 
C. PURPOSE 
Limiting expenses based on purpose is derived from 31 U.S. Code § 1301(a), 
otherwise called the necessary expense doctrine, which states, “appropriations shall be 
applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise 
provided by law.” The necessary expense doctrine is a three-pronged test to determine a 
valid expense. First, the expense must have some rational relationship to the appropriation. 
Second, the expense must not be prohibited by law. Lastly, the expense must not be 
appropriated elsewhere. If an expense fails any of the three test components, there is no 
legal authority to make the expense. If the expense passes all three components, the 
expense can be legally obligated (Candreva, 2008). 
For example, an activity cannot use OMN to build a new building since the purpose 
of OMN is the operation and maintenance of the fleet, and military construction is a more 
appropriate funding source for the new construction of buildings. The activity, however, 
would be able to use OMN to rent a modular or temporary unit while a new building is 
working its way through the military construction process. OMN typically buys “verbs” 
(i.e., operations, training, maintenance) on an incremental or level-of-effort basis. In 
contrast, OPN typically buys “nouns” (i.e., support equipment, software, vehicles) on a 
per-unit basis. Depot-level maintenance has characteristics of both. 
D. TIME
Government funds are appropriated for a specified period of time. Different funds 
have differing time frames to be used. OMN is typically one-year funding, while 
procurement is three-year funding, and military construction is five-year funding. In 
contrast, WCFs have no expiration date as long as they continue to be needed for the 
intended purpose.  
One-year, three-year and five-year funds are generic terms meant to express the 
length of time an activity has to obligate the funds. An obligation is a legal authority to 
enter into a binding agreement for goods or services that will necessitate payment. The 
obligation period is intentionally stated in the Authorizations and Appropriations Act, so 
there is no confusion about the end date of obligation authority. The one-year FY20 OMN 
appropriation is available for new obligations from October 1, 2020, until September 30, 
2021. The three-year FY20 OPN appropriation can obligate funds for new requirements 
from October 1, 2020, until September 30, 2023. After this timeframe, the appropriation 
becomes an expired account, and no new obligations are allowed (Department of Defense, 
2019). The following five-year period is called the expenditure availability period 
(Candreva, 2008). The Department of Defense’s Financial Management Regulation (2019) 
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states that during these five years, the account is available for liquidating previous 
obligations and for obligation adjustments, such as upward obligations for in-scope 
adjustments. After the fifth year, the appropriation account is closed. All remaining 
unexpended balances are canceled and returned to the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts 
(Department of Defense, 2019). Any future liquidation or obligation must be funded using 
available funds. 
Figure 2 shows the timelines for the use of funds. For example, an overhaul starts 
in FY20, and a contract is awarded. Work is scheduled to be completed in late FY21. 
During FY21, additional in-scope work is discovered. If funded with OMN funds, there 
are two choices to fund the additional work. The first is to fund it with current year OMN 
funds, which will reduce the amount of funds planned for other purposes, including other 
ship overhauls. The second way to fund it would be through an upward obligation request. 
An upward obligation is the use of unobligated, expired appropriation for an in-scope 
adjustment to a previous fiscal year appropriation. Upward obligations require Navy and 
Defense Department approval and notification of Congress if the amount is over $10 
million for ship overhauls. Amounts under $10 million require ASN (FMC) approval. The 
upward obligation request must include the amount, purpose, reason and contingencies or 
management practices that caused the request (Department of Defense, 2019). Upward 
obligations, historically, have taken between 26 and 189 days to approve (Oakley, 2020). 
The contracting officer determines an in-scope adjustment as being materially part of the 
scope of the original contract (Department of Defense, 2019). Out-of-scope items would 
include increases in quantity and increases in service levels, which should be funded with 
current year appropriations.  
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Figure 2. OMN and OPN Timelines.  
When using the same scenario with OPN funds, there is no need for an in-scope or 
out-of-scope determination for the first three years since the funds have not expired. The 
shipyard can put the additional work on the contract using the same appropriation. Impacts 
to other overhauls are limited due to the funds still being in a current status.  
The bona fide need rule addresses the time requirement of fund execution. A 
requirement must be valid in the time period to pass the bona fide need rule. The bona fide 
need rule prevents “stocking-up” on supplies needed in future fiscal years to anticipate a 
smaller budget or C.R. On the other hand, units can use current year funds for a needed 
repair that may take place in a future fiscal year. For example, a unit can spend current year 
funds in September for minor habitability work the contractor cannot perform in October 
because the ship’s schedule will not permit the work until later. Further explanation about 
this limitation is discussed in the mission funding section later in this chapter. 
Another determination to consider if the bona fide need rule is being adhered to is 
to look at the contracted task. Suppose the contracted work is a one-time act or service. In 
that case, it is considered non-severable (i.e., one-time tug service to pull a ship into 
drydock). Suppose the work functions can happen in different increments. In that case, it 
is considered severable (i.e., monthly tug ship service to service the fleet). For the former 
example, full funding of the contract is required. The Navy is responsible for funding the 
entire service up-front. For the latter example, the Navy can use incremental funding or 
pay on a monthly basis. For incremental funding, the contract year does not coincide with 
the fiscal year (Candreva, 2008). 
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E. AMOUNT 
The ADA prohibits entities from spending funds they do not have. Overspending 
can come in three different ways. First, a unit can spend more money than it has been 
authorized or allocated. Second, a unit can spend funds that they have not been authorized 
or appropriated yet. The latter can happen in anticipation of future funding, as in a case of 
a new fiscal year, or more commonly, during a CR. Third, a unit accepts “voluntary” work 
performed by a contractor in anticipation of future funds. All three of these cases are 
violations of the ADA, punishable by law. They are required to be reported to the President, 
Congress, Comptroller General, and OMB regardless of the amount (FindLaw, 2016). 
Comptrollers have some measure of flexibility in transferring funds between appropriation 
sub-accounts (Candreva, 2008). While SECDEF can reprogram funds from one 
appropriation account to another (i.e., OPN to OMN) by notifying OMB and Congress, 
however, Congress reserves the right to block the reprogram, if desired. 
F. SHIPYARD FUNDING 
This section will summarize the current funding types used to fund depot-level 
shipyard maintenance. The Navy has used WCFs, OMN, and this OPN pilot program to 
pay for depot-level shipyard maintenance. This project is focused on the differences 
between OMN and OPN. Understanding how depot-level maintenance is funded is central 
to evaluate the benefits and challenges of the different funding methods. 
Currently, the Navy uses OMN to fund depot-level ship repairs. However, in 
FY2020, Congress granted a pilot program to use multi-year OPN funds to determine if 
multi-year funding alleviates some burdens of OMN money. The budget justification 
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) [OUSD (C)], 2020b) identifies 
five advantages for the use of OPN funds: 
1. Avoiding the end of fiscal year “loss” of OMN 
2. Ability to operate under a CR 
3. Better contracting timelines and negotiations 
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4. Reduces changes in ship repair scheduled due to execution year funding 
shortfalls 
5. Ability to use funds in the second and third year (OUSD (C), 2020b). 
Chapters IV and V will address if the execution has met the expectations of these 
advantages.  
OMN and OPN are mission-funded appropriations, meaning the Navy justifies and 
budgets for the funds. Congress has to authorize and appropriate the funds every year via 
the NDAA and Appropriations Act described in Chapter III. This subsection will focus 
mainly on OMN and OPN. The benefits and disadvantages of each will be discussed in 
Chapters IV and V. 
Figure 3 illustrates a simplified flow chart of mission-funded organizations. 
Congress authorizes and appropriates funds based on budget estimates and justifications. 
From there, the funding authority is sent down to the fleet commander via USD (C). The 
fleet commanders, then, fund the cost of the ship maintenance. 
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Figure 3. How Mission Funding Operates. Source: Frisk and Trunkey 
(2007). 
a. Operation and Maintenance, Navy 
The Navy changed its depot-level shipyard funding structure from WCF to OMN, 
starting with Pearl Harbor in 1998, Puget Sound in 2003 and Portsmouth and Norfolk in 
2006 (Congressional Business Office [CBO], 2007). 
According to USD (C), “The Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN) 
appropriation finances the day-to-day costs of operating naval forces, training, including 
fuel, supplies, and maintenance of ships, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, related weapon 
systems, and the support establishment ashore” (2020a, p. 7). 
OMN is a one-year, expense-type account where the activity has budgeted, 
justified, and been authorized and appropriated funds. The funds are customarily 
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apportioned quarterly. OMN accounts are used similarly to a personal bank account. Once 
funds are deposited, debits can be made against the account until there are no funds left. It 
is an ADA violation to spend more funds than are allocated. OMN budgets must go through 
the PPBE process every year to justify their expenses.  
The Navy uses four budget activities to manage OMN funds based on purpose and 
types of activity (USD (C), 2020a). 
• BA 01: Operating Forces 
• BA 02: Mobilization 
• BA 03: Training and Recruiting 
• BA 04: Administration and Service-wide Activities (USD (C), 2020a, 
p. 2). 
Each of these Budget Activities is further broken down into activity groups: 
• 1A: Air Operations 
• 1B: Ship Operations 
• 1C: Combat Operations 
• 1D: Weapons Support 
• 1E: Base Operations (USD (C), 2020a, p. 2). 
The activity groups are further broken down into sub-activity groups. Since this 
research is focused on ship operations, the sub-activity groups are: 
• 1B4B: Mission and Other Ship Operations 
• 1B2B: Ship Operations Support and Training 
• 1B4B: Ship Depot Maintenance 
• 1B5B: Ship Depot Operations (USD (C), 2020a, p. 2). 
Initial funding for this pilot project was transferred from 1B4B, ship depot 
maintenance funds, to an OPN line item explicitly created for this program. The goal of 
OMN is to spend every dollar appropriated on time without going over budget. OMN funds 
are commonly referred to as “use or lose” because if the funds are not obligated by the end 
of the fiscal year, the activity has lost the ability to obligate the funds. The Senate noted 
that ship maintenance accounts for more than 20 percent of undisbursed balances every 
year to justify the formation of the pilot program. 
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b. Procurement  
Procurement, in this thesis, does not refer to the lay term of obtaining a good or 
service. Rather the specific purposes laid forth in the NDAA and Appropriations Act 
referring to the acquisition of investments other than military construction. Procurement, 
in this sense, is an investment type account for items valued at over $250,000. Items below 
this threshold can be purchased using OMN funds. The Department of the Navy operates 
eight procurement programs, weapons procurement, shipbuilding and conversion, national 
defense sealift, consolidated spares and repair parts, aircraft procurement, ammunition, and 
other procurement (USD(C), 2021a). This thesis is focused on other procurement funds. 
USD (C) states, OPN funds are three-year procurement funds used for 
“procurement, production, and modernization of support equipment and materials not 
otherwise provided for … expansion of public and private plants … and procurement and 
installation of equipment” (2021a, Vol. 1-v). Peters and McGarry (2021) note, procurement 
funds typically fund non-construction related items, over $250,000, such as: 
• new military hardware (e.g., aircraft, ships, armored vehicles, radios and 
satellites) 
• upgrades to existing equipment, including service life extension or 
remanufacturing programs 
• weapons and ammunition (e.g., air-to-air missiles and rifle rounds) 
• spares and repair parts (Peters & McGarry, 2021, p.1). 
Generally, procurement funds fall under the full funding policy, meaning the entire 
procurement must have the entire program funded at the start of the procurement. 
Occasionally, in the case of submarines, procurement can happen on an incremental 
funding policy (Peters & McGarry, 2021). 
Regular procurement cycles are not designed to line up with the PPBE cycle. The 
procurement timeline is results-driven, while the PPBE process is calendar-driven. 
However, this pilot program transferring OMN funds to OPN does not suffer from this 
ailment since it was not required to navigate the defense acquisition system and JCIDS 
process.  
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Focusing on OPN, Congress put language into the FY2020 NDAA and FY2020 
Department of Defense Appropriations Act expressly granting authority for the Navy to 
use OPN for this ship depot-level maintenance project.  
The FY 2020 NDAA explicitly authorizes PACFLT to use OPN for a pilot program 
for ship depot maintenance . 
For procurement, production, and modernization of support equipment and 
materials not otherwise provided for…$10,075,257,000, to remain 
available for obligation until September 30, 2022: Provided, That such 
funds are also available for the maintenance, repair, and modernization of 
Pacific Fleet ships under a pilot program established for such purposes 
(Emphasis added). 
The FY 2020 Department of Defense Appropriation Act specifically appropriates 
OPN funds for the pilot program. 
For procurement, production, and modernization of support equipment and 
materials not otherwise provided for…$10,568,201,000, to remain 
available for obligation until September 30, 2022: Provided, That such 
funds are also available for the maintenance, repair, and modernization of 
Pacific Fleet ships under a pilot program established for such purposes 
(Emphasis added). 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A questionnaire was sent to FMB and PACFLT’s comptroller and maintenance 
teams to determine the reasoning to ask for multi-year funding, alternative solutions and 
how they adapted to the change in funding structures. All three entities responded. This 
chapter will use those responses to answer the secondary questions listed in Chapter I. 
A. REASONS TO ASK CONGRESS FOR THE CHANGE 
What was the reason to ask Congress to change the funding structure of ship 
depot maintenance? 
The respondents identified three main reasons for asking Congress for a multi-year 
funding option for ship depot maintenance. The first is the ability to utilize the funds across 
fiscal years and continuing resolutions. Second, multi-year funds could be used to mitigate 
inaccurate and incomplete maintenance planning. Finally, the multi-year funding will 
reduce upward obligations requests. Taken together, the respondents believe multi-year 
funding will give the Navy more financial flexibility and better use of limited funds. 
FMB and PACFLT maintenance planners asserted that two-year OMN funding 
would better coincide with the duration of the majority of availabilities. Two-year OMN 
funding would create more flexibility for multi-year availabilities by providing a stable 
funding source during the second year (and third year for OPN funding) when 75 percent 
of availabilities are completed. Multi-year funds moderate the effects of CRs because funds 
can be obligated throughout the CR since the funds have not expired. The expectation is 
that having an appropriation available to use over multiple years and through a CR allows 
for better contract negotiations without the restrictions imposed on one-year OMN funds 
at the end of the FY. Also, the planners can address emergent repair requirements without 
being rushed to complete the contract toward the end of the fiscal year.  
PACFLT maintenance planners noted that multi-year funding allows the time 
necessary for proper planning of availabilities for the Navy and the contractors by 
eliminating the compressed contracting timeline and “use-or-lose” funding toward the end 
of the fiscal year. The planners noted fiscal law constraints, specifically the time and 
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amount restrictions, create pressure to spend funds toward the end of the FY inefficiently; 
otherwise, they risk losing the ability to spend the funds. The priority is to get a contract 
awarded over completing a proper inspection of the material condition and work 
requirements needed to entirely correct discrepancies. Proper planning of availabilities 
allows for more accurate and complete contracts that are more favorable to the government. 
The funding stability allows the shipyards to better schedule and manage their workflow, 
overhead, and labor, thereby reducing their business risk. Additionally, two-year funds 
allow for the descoping of work and to be able to de-obligate funds and re-obligate the 
funds for another availability in the second (or third) year without the funds expiring, thus 
giving the Navy more buying power by spending all of the funds it is appropriated.  
FMB further stated that maintenance planners have inadequately understood the 
material conditions of ships in availabilities resulting in undervaluing the full scope of work 
and cost required. The delta between what was identified and what needs to be repaired has 
adverse impacts on fleet readiness. It increases the cost and time of the availability. Using 
multi-year funds promotes more efficient use of appropriated funds by negotiating 
favorable contracts and utilizing all available funds, thus, reducing the expired funds 
returned to the Treasury. The more accurate contracts, stability of funding, and reduction 
of business risk allow more competitive bids from shipyards which, typically, end up below 
the government’s estimated cost. More accurate and complete contracts give more realistic 
timeframes and costs, reducing the need to shuffle maintenance schedules to meet current 
shipyard capacity and fiscal year constraints.  
Lastly, the Navy is attempting to limit the number of upward obligation packages. 
Reducing this administrative burden allows the teams to refocus their efforts on operational 
tasks. The benefits they anticipated were to reduce the administrative burden and delay of 
upward obligation requests since 75 percent of availabilities end in the second or third year. 
The multi-year funds would still be available to obligate without delaying an availability 
between 26 and 189 days waiting for the OMN upward obligation request to be approved. 
Multi-year appropriations make adjustments in the second and third years quicker and 
easier than the upward obligation process, which could benefit the on-time rates for the 
completion of overhauls. The expectation for the respondents is that the multi-year funds 
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will have been obligated efficiently over the length of the appropriation, and there will not 
be a need for an upward obligation after the appropriation expires. 
PACFLT comptroller teams were not involved in the discussions about asking 
Congress for two-year OMN funds.  
The respondents were not privy to the Congressional decision-making process that 
determined the OPN funds versus the OMN funds. However, they surmised it was because 
OPN was a three-year appropriation already in place.  
B. POSITIVES IDENTIFIED 
What positive outcomes did the change to OPN create?  
The respondents noted several positive outcomes from this pilot program: the 
efficient use of maintenance funding throughout the fiscal year has led to more efficient 
contracts. Stable funding has led to more favorable contracts leading to increased buying 
power. Quicker and easier obligation adjustments have led to fewer upward obligation 
requests during the pilot program.  
This pilot program extended contract lead times, allowing for long-lead-time items 
to be purchased, improved partnerships with industry, and address emergent repair 
requirements that occur toward the end of the fiscal year without inefficiently rushing 
through the contracting process, noted PACFLT maintenance planners. Earlier 
identification of long-lead-time materials and government-furnished equipment allows the 
Navy to bundle like material needed for multiple ship availabilities, thereby increasing the 
buying power of the Navy. The increased buying power leads to cost savings which can be 
used toward ship maintenance. These outcomes allow the Navy to leverage its buying 
power better. OPN funds grant the financial stability for the Navy to procure long-lead-
time materials and government-furnished equipment earlier in the process, knowing the 
maintenance work will be funded.  
FMB also reported to Congress (Department of the Navy, 2021) that the new 
contracts were more thoroughly complete when awarded. These new contracts require 
fewer modifications which reduces delays in maintenance and increases the efficiency of 
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the contracting workforce. OPN funding allows for earlier contracting without the pressure 
of expiring funds. The ability to use unobligated FY20 funds in FY21 and FY22 creates 
additional buying power and adaptability. This benefit was realized during the COVID-19 
pandemic, where some work could not be completed during the fiscal year. PACFLT was 
able to use the money in FY21 instead of losing the money. Additionally, two availabilities 
were contracted during the FY21 CR. 
The stable funding of multi-year funds increases the cooperation between the 
government and contractors, which benefits the Navy and the shipyards. Both sides reduce 
their business risk with multi-year funding. The government is assured of three years of 
the use funds while reducing the volatility for the contractors. The assurance of funding 
has led to multiple competitive contract bids during this pilot program. Sudden reductions 
in maintenance funding create chaos within the shipyard community. The inability to 
forecast future business leads to safe management decisions, which, in turn, increases the 
cost to the government by limiting contract competition. Volatile budgets can lead to an 
unstable workforce where employees are continually laid off and rehired. Ship 
maintenance is skilled labor in which it takes years for a contractor to recoup the initial 
costs of hiring and training a new employee. The funding stability allows the contractors 
to project their revenues accurately and fund their labor, overhead, and capital investments 
accordingly. 
FMB reported to Congress (Department of the Navy, 2021) that an additional 
availability was awarded because of the cost savings from receiving competitive bids from 
contractors. Without the pressure of funds expiring, $101 million of the FY20 OPN funds 
were obligated in FY21, and $7 million remains available for the remainder of FY21 and 
FY22. Additionally, PACFLT used the OPN funds during the FY21 CR.  
FMB and PACFLT comptroller teams noted the obligations could be adjusted 
anytime during the three years of OPN funds instead of one-year OMN. The two additional 
years to obligate funds lead to the reduced impact of new and growth work at the end of an 
availability. With OMN, if the availability stretches over multiple fiscal years, there are 
three resolutions; first, the Navy can defer the maintenance to another availability. Second, 
the Navy can submit an upward obligation package to use expired funds. And alternatively, 
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third, the Navy can use current year funds to pay for the maintenance. All three of the 
options limit the financial flexibility the Navy has. With the OPN funds, the Navy can pay 
for the maintenance without impacting future requirements 
C. NEGATIVES IDENTIFIED 
What adverse outcomes did the change to OPN create? 
The respondents noted three adverse outcomes from the pilot program. The transfer 
of OMN funds to OPN limits the financial flexibility and adaptability of the OMN account. 
Initial challenges were responding to the change in appropriation accounts, which led to 
additional work. And the scope of the pilot limits how the funds can be utilized.  
All three entities addressed that the transfer of OMN funds to OPN limits the ability 
of the OMN account to absorb shortfalls in other areas funded by OMN funds. Before the 
pilot, shifting availabilities could result in cost savings, which could be used to cover other 
expenses, such as unfunded civilian personnel raises or public shipyard maintenance 
activities. The PACFLT Comptroller asked for a reprogramming authority to move funds 
between 1B4B, OMN and OPN, but it was not granted. 
Challenges in building institutional knowledge and business practices to 
accommodate the change were noted by all respondents. Since this was a pilot program 
that began three months into the FY, there were some inefficiencies in the beginning. 
Computer systems had to be redesigned to handle the new appropriation. The funding had 
to be reversed from OMN to OPN since PACFLT had already contracted availabilities 
using the only available appropriation.  
PACFLT comptroller teams stated that because FY20 began during a CR, PACFLT 
began contracting ship availabilities using OMN funds. After the NDAA and 
Appropriations Act became law, the contracts had to be modified to use OPN funds. This 
process was time-consuming and laborious, which took five months to complete. Two 
additional personnel were added to manage the financial management workload caused by 
the additional funding source. Also, programming budget exhibits had to be recreated to 
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reflect the correct appropriation. The budget exhibits were an initial adverse outcome but 
will become a neutral change in subsequent years. 
In addition, programming budget exhibits, specifically the OP-30, had to be created 
to justify the budget request to Congress. System engineering tracking tools had to be 
redesigned to account for the additional appropriation, PACFLT officials stated. Financial 
management software, specifically Standard Accounting, Budgeting, and Reporting 
System (SABRS), Command Financial Management System (CFMS), and 
Program/Budget Information System (PBIS), had to be updated to include the additional 
appropriation. The additional work required to begin this project is communicated as an 
adverse outcome because the change in funding happened in the middle of the execution 
year. The entities had to adjust their priorities and staff to accomplish the products. This 
issue should turn into a neutral change in the subsequent years. 
PACFLT comptroller and maintenance teams noted that the scope of the pilot 
program limits it to only private depot-level maintenance. While OMN is used for forward-
deployed naval forces, other restricted availabilities/technical availabilities, continuous 
maintenance, emergent restricted availabilities/technical availabilities, and intermediate-
level maintenance. This limitation requires the PACFLT teams to closely monitor their 
expenditures to ensure these availabilities are being funded with the correct appropriation. 
This restriction limits the pilot program by design to test this change in a structured way to 
reduce risk to the maintenance community. 
D. SUMMARY 
To assess this pilot program, recall the maintenance and funding problems the Navy 
faces, as described in Chapter II. The less organizational maintenance completed onboard 
led to longer and more expensive depot-level availabilities. A lack of stable funding due to 
the CRs led to inefficient contract management toward the end of the FY and business risk 
for the Navy and shipyards. Finally, the shorter window of funds availability led to rushed 
planning and contracting where the Navy inadequately understood the material condition 
of the ships and contracted for incomplete availabilities. 
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This pilot program does not address the amount of organizational maintenance 
performed onboard ships; however, it does address the depot maintenance issues that stem 
from them. The pilot program allows maintenance planners more time to identify the issues 
and create a more complete plan to address them. The better and more complete the initial 
planning is, the more accurate the repair timelines are. This increased accurateness allows 
the fleet schedulers to better manage their assets and responsibilities.  
Lack of stable funding has long plagued the Navy’s readiness. This pilot program 
gives the funding stability the Navy needs. It ensures funds are available for three years. 
This stability allows the Navy to better plan availabilities and negotiate more favorable 
contracts with the shipyards by reducing the business risk for the Navy and shipyards. It 
reduces the administrative burden and delays caused by upward obligation requests 
because the funds are available for three years. 
Finally, the pilot program allows for more efficient use of funds throughout the 
entire year. Due to perennial CRs, the Navy is rarely able to use the entire year to obligate 
their funding, leading to rushed, inefficient processes toward the end of the FY. This pilot 
program lengthens the availability of funds which allows the maintenance planners more 
time to efficiently obligate their funding without the pressure of losing that funding at the 
end of the FY. Efficient planning has led to more complete and more favorable contracts 
for the Navy. The additional time has also allowed the planners to award contracts at the 
120-days before the contract start, as identified in its best practices. 
In conclusion, this pilot program corrects many of the inefficiencies that have 
plagued the OMN funding process. OPN funds allow the maintenance planners the time to 
identify more repairs that decrease the new and growth work, which delays on-time 
deliveries and increases the availability costs. The additional time also allows for a better 
and more complete contracting process, which reduces business risk to the Navy and 
shipyards resulting in more favorable contract awards. Finally, having three years to 
obligate the funds allows for quicker and easier adjustments which reduce the 
administrative burden and delays caused by upward obligations. 
  
38 




The purpose of this research was to investigate if the PACFLT pilot program using 
OPN funding instead of OMN funding for private shipyard depot maintenance resolved the 
funding and financial flexibility problems, created new problems, or created neutral 
changes. This research focused on the viewpoint of the Navy Secretariat, PACFLT’s 
comptroller and maintenance team. This research aimed to answer four research questions 
related to the change in funding structure and the adaptation of the change. A questionnaire 
was used to identify issues related to each area. 
A. SUMMARY 
To summarize this research, one must look at the central question posed in Chapter 
I. The following conclusion was made after analyzing the questionnaire answers and 
quarterly and annual reports to Congress.  
Did changing funding sources from OMN to OPN achieve more financial 
flexibility for ship depot maintenance?  
Changing the funding source from OMN to OPN did achieve more financial 
flexibility for ship depot maintenance. Five main benefits and one secondary benefit were 
achieved. First, it allowed for better contracting strategies to be used. Second, the Navy 
can recapitalize on deobligated funds and descoped availabilities. Third, those contracting 
strategies allowed for competitive bids from contractors, reducing the amount of most 
contracts. Fourth, it allows for the use of OPN funds during a CR. Finally, it alleviates the 
time pressures for contracting toward the end of the fiscal year. Unbeknown when 
authorized, it allowed for better spending and planning during the COVID-19 crisis without 
the risk of “use-or-lose” funds.  
The Navy has identified a best practice of awarding a ship maintenance contract 
120 days before the availability starting (U.S. Navy, 2021). By switching from a one-year 
appropriation to a three-year appropriation, the Navy and the contractor base can better 
plan availabilities and bundle long-lead-time materials and government-furnished 
equipment to utilize the available funding effectively. 
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The Navy has identified, and Congress has acknowledged (U.S. Senate, 2020) that 
20 percent of OMN funds that are unobligated come from the 1B4B ship maintenance 
account. The loss of this funding creates further readiness gaps for the fleet. The loss of 
funds has a two-fold effect. First, the Navy is unable to utilize the funds that were 
authorized and appropriated. Second, current year funds that were not programmed or 
budgeted would have to be used for any new or growth work that arises. The ability to 
reobligate funds increases the Navy’s buying power and enhances fleet readiness by using 
the funds for the purpose and amount it was authorized and appropriated.  
Stable funding means the contractors are assured of future work and can more 
accurately plan their projects and workforce. This stability has resulted in less risk for the 
contractors, which results in more favorable contracts for the Navy. Since the pilot project 
began, the savings were enough to award an additional contract in FY 20. 
Continuing resolutions have been a budgetary norm for the past 50 years. Since 
1971, only ten times has the defense appropriations passed and signed into law on time 
(DeBruyne & Torreon, 2020). Debruyne & Torreon also noted that the average CR lasted 
72 days when late. Having a CR last for over two months each year has a dramatic effect 
on the buying power of the Navy. It also gives business risk to the shipyards. Combining 
the reduced buying power and business risk for the contractors, the Navy has been 
negotiating from an inferior position. Using OPN during CRs effectively flips the power 
continuum and gives the Navy a superior position at the negotiating table. Also, it allows 
the Navy to exercise the necessary funds vice the funds available to maintain the fleet. 
The end of the fiscal year creates legally imposed timelines and barriers not seen 
outside the government. These barriers and timelines create a pressurized atmosphere 
within the government to use the available funds or are lost forever. The pressure to use 
the funds has resulted in business risk for the Navy. The Navy is rushed into shortened 
planning and scoping of work and has, historically, inadequately understood the material 
condition of the ships and undervalued the work needed to be performed to maintain the 
ships. This time constraint has led to rushed contracts that necessitate growth work and 
new work, which has led to upward obligations to pay for the work without using current 
year funds. 
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Some negatives should be noted. First, using two different funding appropriations 
has limited the ability of the fleet to cover financial shortfalls in other areas that may take 
priority over ship maintenance. This negative impact is a permanent limitation on the use 
of OPN funds. Second, the pilot program was only used for private shipyard availabilities. 
Only half of the shipyard availabilities are private, while the other half are public. This 
thesis cannot be generalized to private shipyards since procurement funds are generally not 
allowed for civilian personnel. Third, much re-work had to be done to change the already-
contracted ship availabilities to OPN from OMN. Third, much work products had to be 
created on the fly because there was no prior warning that the multi-year funding would be 
OPN instead of the two-year OMN requested. Programming and budget exhibits had to be 
redone. Computer systems and systems execution tracking systems had to be redesigned to 
handle the new appropriation. This negative impact is temporary and has already been 
resolved. 
This thesis supports the further use of OPN funds for private shipyard depot-level 
maintenance. The Navy also believes this pilot program is beneficial. Therefore, the FY22 
President’s Budget has requested to increase funding for this pilot, continue the PACFLT 
pilot, and expand it to include USFF. 
B. LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
This thesis was limited in the duration of the data and the scope of the respondents. 
Data collection occurred in the second year of a three-year appropriation. Data sources 
were only gathered from the Secretariat and PACFLT. After the third-year timeframe, there 
are future opportunities for research to include data from Congress or its agents and other 
Defense Department stakeholders. 
1. Additional Stakeholders 
Additional stakeholders that could have been consulted include the HASC, SASC, 
HAC and SAC. In addition, NAVSEA, the shipyard contractors, the fleet schedulers, and 
PEOs are stakeholders in the ship maintenance process that were not included in this study. 
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The viewpoint of these entities would help gain a more comprehensive view of the 
positives and negatives associated with the funding change. 
2. Reassess after FY 23 
This thesis was written in the middle of the pilot project. Therefore, qualitative 
analysis of the pilot program to determine the actual financial impacts of the pilot program 
would enable the decision-makers better information to make this program permanent or 
revert to OMN funding. 
3. United States Fleet Forces Anticipated Pilot 
The Presidential Budget for FY 22 has included a pilot program for United States 
Fleet Forces (USFF) to use OPN for private ship depot maintenance. Therefore, a 
comparison between PACFLT and USFF could be beneficial to see if the efficiencies 




Questions for PACFLT Comptroller and Maintenance Personnel 
 
Questions about the nature of the problem(s) and alternative solutions 
1. What were the problems that funding overhauls with one-year funds caused the Navy to 
seek multi-year funding authority? 
2. What was the argument for how would 2-year O&MN funding would resolve those 
problems? 
3. Were any new or different problems with 2-year O&MN anticipated?  
a. If so, what were they? 
b. What were the mitigation strategies? 
4. Has the use of OPN resolved the fundamental problems associated with one-year funds? 
5. What new or different problems has OPN created?  
a. How are they being mitigated? 
6. What new flexibilities or opportunities were presented with OPN funds that were not 
anticipated?  
a. How are they being taken advantage of? 
7. What was the rationale behind granting the Navy OPN instead of multi-year O&MN? 
 
Questions about adapting to the change 
1. Explain any differences in the funds flow for OPN compared to O&MN. I.e., are funds 
received annually versus quarterly, or are funds received later in the FY, or are they 
more or less affected by continuing resolutions? 
2. Explain any differences in the scope of what may be procured in OPN versus O&MN. I.e., 
is the Navy permitted to do everything that had been funded under 1B4B under OPN, or 
more, or less? 
3. What processes or systems needed to be changed to process OPN funding? 
4. Typically, OPN is budgeted on a line item basis and depot maintenance on an activity 
(level of effort) basis. What is the “line item” for OPN overhauls?  I.e., is it a single line 
item, the hull number, the type of availability, a portion of the work package? 
a. If there is more than one OPN line item, do you need to do a formal (ATR or 
BTR) to shift funds from one hull (or other line item) to another? 
5. What is different about adjusting obligations based on changes to the scope or price of 
an availability when funded with OPN versus O&MN? 
6. Typically, an overhaul includes both maintenance tasks (O&MN funded) and 
modernization work (OPN or SCN funded). Has that changed, and how?  
7. Work in domestic yards is still funded with O&MN and only contracted work in 
commercial yards is funded with OPN. What affect has this had on overall fleet 
maintenance flexibility and responsiveness? 
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